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This book opens and closes with the discussion of a passage by Chomsky (2001: 37-38) to the effect that head movement is not part of the narrow syntax. In answer to it, Roberts presents a strong and often convincing case in favor of the classical notion of syntactic head movement, providing a key reference for anybody wanting to either uphold that notion or argue against it.

Chomsky's main empirical argument is that semantic effects of head raising are "slight or nonexistent". In chapter 1 of the book, Roberts provides a compelling rebuttal of the argument based on well-known minimal pairs such as English *Hasn't anybody answered?* vs. **Anybody hasn't answered*. One could try mimicking the effects of syntactic head movement via VP-remnant movement. But as Roberts correctly points out, this would imply complicating the c-command definition of scope that allows the negative polarity item to be licenced by the negation. Chapter 2 addresses another objection raised by Chomsky, concerning the difficulty of providing formal grounds for the (non-)application of pied-piping. The solution that Chomsky suggests is essentially rendering syntactic pied-piping obligatory. Roberts preliminarily notices that the obligatoriness of pied-piping could be enforced by the A-over-A constraint, whose classical formulation requires any operation targeting A to target the maximal phrase of category A. But of course if A lacks internal structure (i.e. it is both minimal and maximal), then head movement is allowed; Roberts argues that this is what happens in cliticization. V-movement is a different matter. Adopting work by Rackowsky and Richards, Roberts assumes that movement of a goal α is blocked only if there is a distinct goal β that c-commands it. Since a maximal projection never c-commands its head nor viceversa (because of their containment relation), movement of a head is always possible from

within its maximal projection (though instances of A-over-A ‘at a distance’ are still blocked, irrelevantly for the present discussion).

The details of cliticization are dealt with by Roberts in chapter 3, which alone represents about half of the book. For Roberts, cliticization consists of the movement of the clitic from the complement position where it is first-merged to a position adjoined to v , namely the Marantzian category defining the word phase (adjunction is to the left in compliance with Kayne’s LCA). The reason why the clitic moves to the edge of the v -phase is that the interpretable ϕ -features of the clitic value the uninterpretable ϕ -features of v . Following proposals of Cardinaletti and Starke, the categorial status of the clitic is characterized as ϕP , since, “clitic pronouns consist only of the inflectional part of the structure of a pronoun” (56). It turns out therefore that clitics “do not have a label distinct from their host” (55). This ‘defective’ nature of clitic goals means that in the case of cliticization “*Agree and Move/Internal Merge are formally indistinguishable* [Author’s emphasis]” (60). In Agree generally “the goal does not constitute an identical copy of the copied features bundle. But, precisely in the case of incorporation, this is what happens. For this reason we see the PF-effect of movement, with the ϕ -features realized on the probe and the copy deleted” (61). This also allows Roberts to dispose of one the strongest objections raised by Chomsky (2001) against syntactic head-movement, namely the fact that the adjoined landing site does not c-command the trace. I quote: “If cliticization is triggered by Agree, then it is unclear that any c-command relation is required beyond that between the probe and the goal, postulated independently of movement” (59).

While Roberts’s preoccupation is mostly with the formal aspects of the theory, the actual implementation of his ideas, in the empirical domains he chooses, requires a certain amount of substantive assumptions. Thus the system of non-distinctness that cliticization depends on, requires the assumptions that the clitic is a ϕP and that the verb hosting it has object agreement features. It seems to me that these substantive assumptions bring into sharper focus what the limitations of the approach pursued by Roberts may eventually be. Let us begin with the idea that the verb agrees

with the direct object. This is of course motivated by the fact that a Romance language like Italian presents overt agreement between the object clitic and the past participle; it is true that there is no agreement between the object clitic and the finite verb – but we may simply say that the morphology does not support this. Consider however Spanish, where object clitics combine with invariable forms of the past participle. Of course it is not the case that Spanish simply lack a participial agreement morphology, since this systematically shows up in copular environments. Similarly it is morphologically inaccurate to say that Spanish does not realize agreement morphology in non-copular contexts, since the verb stem is obligatorily associated with the *-o* ending for masculine singular.

All of these observations would presumably be dismissed as irrelevant by Roberts, in line with standard assumptions about agreement within the minimalist framework. Indeed, though most explicit in Optimality Theory, the assumption in much current generative practice is that a phenomenon seen in one language/ environment (for instance Italian past participle agreement with the object 3rd person clitic) can be posited to be universal. Parametrization is a matter of constraint ranking (lower or higher ranking of faithfulness and other constraints) in OT, and a matter of systematic morphological readjustment in standard frameworks. In the latter we are then left with a morphological component devoted largely to opacizing an essentially universal abstract syntax. We are also left without a clear notion of lexical item, and therefore of variation (and change) in the lexicon, since if syntax is underlying uniform, variation becomes a mere matter of ‘exponence’. Though these conclusions are embraced by Distributed Morphology, and implicitly or explicitly by most practitioners of generative theory, it is far from evident that they yield the simplest possible grammar (in accordance with methodological minimalism).

Similarly, consider the assumption that clitics are ϕ P’s, as opposed in particular to full pronouns, that are DP’s. Such an assumption means that Roberts cannot capture the obvious parallelism between full pronouns and clitics both interpretively and morpholexically – and specifically the fact that both semantics and morphology independently support a complex

structuring of both, including a definiteness component (*l*- in Romance) as well as an inflectional ϕ -features component (the nominal class vowel in Romance). In the words of Manzini and Savoia (2008: 44-45), “clitic pronouns ... are not elementary lexical entries, but correspond to the merger of two separate morphemes, namely an *l/d/f* allomorph, introducing definite reference, and inflectional endings introducing the properties traditionally described in terms of number, gender and Case. This analysis is particularly transparent for [Sardinian varieties] ... as schematized in the lexicon ... *d*: Definiteness; *a, u*: Nominal class; *s*: Plurality”. Strikingly, despite the fact that the motivation for these conclusions is largely morphological (coming from allomorphies, mutual exclusions and the like), they almost verbatim coincide with those that Kratzer (2009: 221) draws from the semantic analysis of (full) pronouns: “the alleged “3rd person” features are in fact gender features, a variety of descriptive feature ... If [a descriptive feature] is to grow into a pronoun, it has to combine with a feature [def] that turns it into a definite description. If [def] is the familiar feature that can also be pronounced as a definite determiner in certain configurations, it should head its own functional projection, hence be a D. It would then not originate in the same feature set as descriptive features, which are nominal, hence Ns”.

Here again, one gets the sense that exactly as abstract, rather than overt, agreement is relevant to Roberts, so the actual interface properties of clitics are not directly relevant to the sort of abstract clitics that the syntax manipulates. Yet in this second instance, it is not just the morphological interface that is at stake, but also the LF interface; in other words the formal computational system is interpretively as well as morphologically opaque, so that semantic no less than morphological enrichments (or impoverishments respectively) will presumably have to be introduced. Roberts is aware of the issue, which he briefly addresses (in fn. 83 to chapter 3) by suggesting that clitics may have an empty determiner layer. But if D is to be interpreted, it cannot fail to contain a Definiteness feature – which will inhibit the ‘defective’ probe-goal relation. Nor can deletion take place until PF, so that movement must see D – or indeed take place at PF.

For all of this, it must be acknowledged that the care that Roberts takes in covering all of the standard empirical ground in Romance cliticization is remarkable – and quite an achievement in itself. Specifically, clitic climbing in restructuring and causative constructions is dealt with as an instance of successive-cyclic head movement, depending on a Cinquean treatment of restructuring and causative predicates as functional heads. Furthermore, the treatment described so far for object clitics (incorporation into *v*) is argued to extend to incorporation into the C phase head (second position clitics, notably in Slavic languages) and to subject clitics (incorporation into T). The discussion of Germanic/ Romance verb movement in chapter 4 completes the empirical picture with a discussion of verb movement to T and to C, including instances of Long Verb Movement.

In chapter 5, concluding the review of the objections raised by Chomsky (2001), Roberts convincingly argues that head movement is not different from phrasal movement with respect to locality conditions, in particular “we expect to find cases of heads ‘skipping’ an intermediate head. As long as this takes place within a single phase, and as long as the non-intervention requirement on Agree is satisfied, this is allowed” (193). A further objection raised by Chomsky is that head movement is not successive-cyclic. Again the response of Roberts is an empirical one, since he treats so-called clitic climbing as an instance of successive-cyclic cliticization. As Chomsky (2001) observes, adjunction to a head leads to countercyclicity, in the sense that it violates the Extension Condition; yet Roberts points out that on the basis of Chomsky’s later proposal, A-movement also does, since it targets [Spec, TP] after the phasal C head has been introduced. Hence once again head movement and A-movement can be seen to have the same properties. The very last section of the book (before the conclusions) is devoted to showing that a perfect symmetry can be established between phrasal and head movement, which differ only with respect to pied-piping. The standard instances of head-movement (including cliticization and V-to-T movement) involve Agree, as A-movement does. However exactly as there are instances of phrasal movement (A’-movement) that do not involve Agree, so “we expect to find A’ head movement – that is, a head movement triggered purely by EF [Edge Feature]” (209), indeed exemplified by Long Verb Movement.

This is a system of undoubted elegance. With this book, Roberts has successfully picked up Chomsky's challenge and put forward a strong case for classical head movement. What seems to me to remain open is the more general tensions that Chomsky's (2001) discussion of head movement is a spy of – between the operations of the standard computational component in generative grammar and the requirements that the interfaces, including the lexical interface (conventionally PF), impose on them.

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